DIPLOMATIC MEMORANDA OF KAHARAGIA

Diplomatic Memorandum on the Recognition of the Republic of Kosovo

DM-2026-005

Diplomatic Memorandum on the Recognition of the Republic of Kosovo

Statehood, international administration and the protection of non-Albanian communities

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The Determination

POSITION OF THE STATE

Kaharagia recognises the Republic of Kosovo as a sovereign and independent state

SELF-DETERMINATION	The people of Kosovo hold a sustained and valid claim to independent statehood.
FAMILY OF CLAIM	Separation from a settled state, on the exhausted-remedy route of DM-2026-001.
EXTERNAL CONTROL	Dependency. Neither effective control nor absorption is found.
STATE RECOGNITION	Extended in full. Disposition: recognition.
GOVERNMENT	Kosovo's constitutional institutions are recognised as entitled to act for the state. No administration is endorsed.
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS	Not established by this instrument. Reserved to a separate decision.
TERRITORY	Kosovo within its existing constitutional boundaries, subject to any peaceful agreement with Serbia.

COMMON DOCTRINAL BASIS

A people's right to self-determination is not extinguished by an inherited border. Nor is it fulfilled by foreign occupation, coerced integration, ethnic cleansing, demographic engineering, or a nominal independence maintained under another state's effective control. Recognition of a state is separate from endorsement of its government and from the establishment of diplomatic relations.

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1. Executive Position

Kaharagia recognises the Republic of Kosovo as a sovereign and independent state. Kosovo's case combines a long-standing political claim, grave conflict and repression, an extended period of United Nations administration, failed status negotiations, a declaration of independence, functioning institutions and extensive foreign relations. The International Court of Justice, in an advisory opinion delivered on 22 July 2010, held by ten votes to four that the declaration of independence adopted on 17 February 2008 did not violate international law.

Recognition is extended with a firm insistence that Kosovo remain a multi-ethnic state. Independence is not an ethnic title held solely by Kosovo Albanians. Kosovo's own Constitution declares the Republic a multi-ethnic society consisting of Albanian and other communities, makes Albanian and Serbian official languages of the state, and guarantees twenty of the Assembly's one hundred and twenty seats to communities that are not in the majority, ten of them to the Serb community. Kaharagia measures Kosovo against those provisions because they are Kosovo's own.

1.1 Three Decisions Taken Here, One Reserved

Kosovo is settled on four separate questions: whether a people holds a legitimate claim to determine its status, whether an entity is a state, whether particular institutions may act for it, and whether Kaharagia exchanges representatives with it. Kosovo satisfies the first two. The third recognises constitutional institutions and endorses no administration, because a state's legal personality does not follow the conduct of those holding office in it. The fourth is not taken here at all.

2. The Tests Applied: Dismantled Autonomy, Sustained Statehood

DM-2026-001 treats internal self-determination as the ordinary form: equal citizenship, participation, language and cultural rights, meaningful local government, and a lawful route to constitutional change. External self-determination becomes a remedy only where a people has been excluded, repressed and left without a credible constitutional path. The question is whether a rights-respecting order remained possible inside the existing state.

Kosovo held substantial autonomy within socialist Yugoslavia. It was dismantled under Serbian rule. Kosovo Albanians were excluded from institutions and organised parallel civic structures because the official ones were shut to them. Armed conflict and mass displacement followed. The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights published its analysis of the human rights findings of the Kosovo Verification Mission for October 1998 to June 1999 on 5 November 1999.

What happened in those months is a judicial finding, not a Kaharagian characterisation. On 26 February 2009 the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia convicted five senior Yugoslav and Serbian officials of crimes in Kosovo and acquitted one. The Chamber found a broad campaign of violence directed against the Kosovo Albanian civilian population by army and interior ministry police forces be-

tween March and June 1999, including mass expulsions, killings, sexual assault and the intentional destruction of mosques, and found that at least 700,000 Kosovo Albanians left Kosovo in that period.

Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), adopted under Chapter VII at the Council's 4011th meeting on 10 June 1999, replaced the collapsed relationship with international civil and security presences. It provided for an interim administration under which the people of Kosovo could enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, reaffirmed in its preamble the commitment of Member States to that state's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and required the facilitation of a political process designed to determine Kosovo's future status. That process was attempted and failed. On 26 March 2007 the Secretary-General transmitted the report of his Special Envoy to the Council as document S/2007/168. The Council adopted nothing on it.

Each element is met, and met in sequence. The internal remedy was removed by the state that owed it, and the declaration came after that removal, the intervening administration and the failure of negotiations, not instead of them. Kosovo then took the settlement proposals into its own law rather than receiving them as an imposition. Its Constitution carries an article on the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, and its Assembly enacted Law No. 03/L-039 on Special Protective Zones on 4 June 2008 to protect Serbian Orthodox monasteries, churches and other religious, historical and cultural sites. The Comprehensive Proposal was a proposal and never a binding instrument. Its weight here comes from Kosovo's adoption of it.

2.1 The Eleven Seats Left Empty on 17 February 2008

DM-2026-001 puts one question ahead of consent. Before asking what a people has chosen, Kaharagia asks who was permitted to choose. Kosovo's answer sits on the face of the record and has to be stated before the declaration is weighed.

The declaration was adopted at a meeting held on 17 February 2008 by 109 of the 120 members of the Assembly of Kosovo, together with the Prime Minister and the President of Kosovo, who was not a member of the Assembly. The ten members representing the Kosovo Serb community and the one member representing the Kosovo Gorani community decided not to attend. The text was read out, voted upon and signed by the representatives present.

Those eleven seats were held, and their holders kept them. Declining to attend a sitting is not the same as being shut out of one. The constituency rule in DM-2026-001 bars the disqualification of residents on grounds of origin, ethnicity, religion or date of arrival, and bars the removal of displaced people from a status process. It does not oblige an assembly to obtain the votes of members who stay away.

The part of the rule about populations introduced by a controlling power does not engage here. That part exists to stop an electorate created by settlement from converting control into sovereignty. The controlling power in Kosovo was Serbia, and the conduct the Tribunal found was expulsion rather than importation. An electorate reduced by force is not an electorate manufactured by settlement.

The part about displacement does engage, and it runs against any assumption that absence settles anything. Resolution 1244 made assuring the safe and unimpeded return

of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo a responsibility of the civil presence, and made the establishment of a secure environment for that return a task of the security presence. Where a status process is held, DM-2026-001 requires that people displaced from the territory not be shut out of it because return has not yet been achieved. Kosovo took on that requirement together with the independence it declared.

The declaration claims more for itself than the arithmetic of one sitting. Its operative text opens, "We, the democratically-elected leaders of our people, hereby declare Kosovo to be an independent and sovereign state", and states that the declaration "reflects the will of our people". Kaharagia reads that as a claim of representation advanced by an elected assembly, and not as the recorded verdict of the whole population.

Principle IX of the annex to resolution 1541 (XV) is the procedural measure DM-2026-001 borrows for such claims. It required that wishes be expressed "through informed and democratic processes, impartially conducted and based on universal adult suffrage", and provided that the United Nations could supervise those processes when it deemed supervision necessary. The standard was written for integration with an independent state, the least contested transition of the decolonisation era. Kaharagia does not present 17 February 2008 as satisfying it. Recognition here rests on the removal of the internal remedy, and the constituency question is answered by who was free to take a seat.

2.2 Statehood, External Relations and the Patron Question

The indicia in DM-2026-001 are a permanent population, an identifiable territory, institutions capable of public government, and capacity to conduct external relations, weighed together with legality and legitimacy. The Kosovo Agency of Statistics recorded a resident population of 1,602,515 at the census taken in the field between 5 April and 24 May 2024. Kosovo has constitutional institutions, a functioning public order and extensive foreign relations, and its Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that 117 countries have recognised it. Under DM-2026-001 that count is a fact about those states and not an answer to the question asked here.

Kosovo exercised external capacity where it counts, engaging directly under European Union facilitation in the negotiations that produced the Agreement on the Path to Normalisation of 27 February 2023 and the Implementation Annex agreed at Ohrid on 18 March 2023.

The harder question is the patron question. Dependency alone does not make a state unreal. What matters is whether institutions retain a meaningful freedom to refuse, renegotiate or terminate the relationship they depend on. Kosovo's separate administration was established under a Security Council mandate, not by a neighbouring state pressing a claim of its own through it. An entity sustained by such a neighbour cannot show that its independence is its own choice. Kosovo's administration was not established that way, though the intervention made neither every military act lawful nor every legal question settled.

The presences that remain are multilateral and answer to no single interested neighbour. The Kosovo Force operates under resolution 1244 and, on NATO's account pub-

lished on 10 August 2026, numbers approximately 4,600 troops from thirty-one allied and partner countries. The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo continues under the same resolution. On the scale in DM-2026-001, Kaharagia places Kosovo at the first degree, dependency, and not at effective control or absorption.

3. The Advisory Opinion and Resolution 1244: What Neither Settles

The General Assembly, by resolution 63/3 of 8 October 2008, asked the Court whether the declaration was in accordance with international law. A request from the General Assembly is not a request from the Security Council, and the answer to it is an advisory opinion and not a judgment. The Court found unanimously that it had jurisdiction, decided by nine votes to five to comply with the request, and held by ten votes to four that the declaration adopted on 17 February 2008 did not violate international law. That is the whole of the holding, and its character matters as much as its content.

The Court decided the question put and no other. It declined to say whether international law confers a positive entitlement to declare independence, and it addressed neither the legal consequences of the declaration nor whether Kosovo had thereby become a state. Its route to the answer was narrow. State practice disclosed no rule of general international law prohibiting declarations of independence. The Court further found that resolution 1244 did not bar the authors of the declaration from issuing it, and that those authors acted as representatives of the people of Kosovo outside the framework of the interim administration rather than as a Provisional Institution of Self-Government.

The Court announced no general right of unilateral secession, and Kaharagia claims none on Kosovo's behalf. Resolution 1244 did not authorise Kosovo's separation from Serbia, and this publication does not pretend otherwise. Neither can 1244 require the indefinite restoration of Serbian rule regardless of all that followed. It continues to frame the international presences and the unresolved relationship between the two.

Kaharagia's recognition of Kosovo is a decision of policy with legal consequences. It is not a judicial finding about any state or any person.

4. The Objections: Serbia's Border, the Precedent and the Crimes on Both Sides

The strongest objection is Serbia's and is stated here at full strength. Territorial integrity is a rule of the international order, not a technicality. Kosovo separated without Serbian consent, and no organ competent to transfer sovereignty authorised it. If a province may leave whenever its grievance is grave enough, the rule protects nothing, and the weakest states suffer first.

DM-2026-001 does not treat territorial integrity as defeated by grievance, but as defeated by the parent state's own destruction of the internal remedy, and only then. Serbia's claim is not answered by Kosovo Albanian unhappiness. It is answered by the dismantled autonomy, the exclusion, the repression found by the Tribunal and the

failed negotiations. A state that removes every internal route to a peaceful settlement of status cannot then invoke the rule protecting settled internal orders.

4.1 Kosovo Beside Abkhazia, Cyprus and Somaliland

The second objection is that recognising Kosovo binds Kaharagia everywhere, a reading useful to opposed parties for opposed reasons. The Assessment Framework requires each case to be decided on its facts, and that can be checked. The same doctrine produced hedged recognition for Abkhazia, deferral for South Ossetia, deferral for Transnistria, and non-recognition required for the present Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Kosovo is a precedent for the method, not the outcome.

A reader of DM-2026-008 will ask why a declaration following intercommunal conflict, foreign intervention and division is recognised here and refused there. Two things separate them. The Court found Kosovo's declaration not contrary to international law, whereas DM-2026-008 records that the Security Council treated the 1983 declaration as legally invalid and called on states not to recognise it. That memorandum also rests on findings of Turkish effective overall control, for which the Kosovo record holds no equivalent. Turkish Cypriot rights affirmed there are untouched here.

Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria turn on the test Kosovo passes: whether authorities claiming to embody a people's choice are free to make it. Kosovo differs on one further rule. In Abkhazia, Kaharagia held that a post-war population cannot settle every question where the electorate was transformed by wartime expulsion. Kosovo's claim was not built by removing the community that opposed it. The rule binds Kosovo in the other direction too. No person displaced from Kosovo, of any community, loses a claim to return, property, restitution or compensation because independence succeeded.

Western Sahara is unfinished decolonisation, and Kaharagia does not borrow that vocabulary here. Somaliland is the closer case, and the difference is the reservation. DM-2026-007 reserves the status of contested eastern territories because communities there reject Hargeisa's authority. No equivalent appears here, and not because northern Kosovo is uncontested. The reservations differ in kind. Somaliland's leaves open which state an area belongs to. Kosovo's fixes the boundary as it stands and leaves open only how it may change: by peaceful agreement with Serbia and no other route.

4.2 Crimes, Proceedings and Reciprocal Accountability

The convictions entered against Serbian and Yugoslav officials are specific, and the sentences that stand are those entered on appeal. At trial on 26 February 2009 Nikola Sainovic, Nebojsa Pavkovic and Sreten Lukic were convicted of deportation, forcible transfer, murder and persecution as crimes against humanity and each sentenced to twenty-two years, and Dragoljub Ojdanic and Vladimir Lazarevic were convicted of aiding and abetting deportation and forcible transfer and each sentenced to fifteen years. On 23 January 2014 the Appeals Chamber reduced Sainovic to eighteen years, Lukic to twenty and Lazarevic to fourteen, and affirmed Pavkovic's twenty-two years. Ojdanic withdrew his appeal and was granted early release in July 2013. Those are the terms that stand. Milan Milutinovic was acquitted on all counts, and an acquittal is as

much a part of the record as a conviction. On 27 January 2014 the Appeals Chamber confirmed Vlastimir Dordevic's responsibility for crimes in Kosovo as a participant in a joint criminal enterprise directed at changing the ethnic composition of the territory, and reduced his sentence from twenty-seven years to eighteen.

Violations after the withdrawal are on the record as well. The OSCE Mission in Kosovo published a companion volume on 5 November 1999 covering 14 June to 31 October 1999, the first months under the international presences.

Members of the Kosovo Liberation Army and other Albanian actors have faced criminal proceedings. The Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor's Office sit in The Hague, apply Kosovo law, and have jurisdiction over crimes commenced or committed in Kosovo between 1 January 1998 and 31 December 2000. Salih Mustafa was convicted of war crimes and his sentence fixed at fifteen years. Pjeter Shala was convicted of arbitrary detention, torture and murder, his sentence reduced on appeal to thirteen years. Hysni Gucati and Nasim Haradinaj were convicted of offences against the administration of justice.

The principal case is not decided. Evidence in the proceedings against Hashim Thaci, Kadri Veseli, Rexhep Selimi and Jakup Krasniqi closed on 18 December 2025 after 134 witnesses, closing statements ran from 9 to 18 February 2026, and the Chambers announced on 1 July 2026 that trial judgment would be pronounced on 16 September 2026. Kaharagia holds no view on the outcome and will publish none before it is delivered.

An allegation is an assertion not yet tested. A decision to bring a case is not a finding of guilt. A proceeding is not a judgment, only a judgment convicts, and a trial judgment subject to appeal is not the end of the matter. Kaharagia treats no person as guilty because a case was brought, and no community as answerable for a case at all. Individual criminal responsibility and the legal personality of the state are separate questions.

Kaharagia supports impartial war-crimes proceedings, missing-person identification, archives access, witness protection, reparations and memorialisation. The International Committee of the Red Cross reported in April 2023 that more than 1,600 people who went missing during the conflict were still unaccounted for. Justice mechanisms must meet fair-trial standards and resist political interference from both Pristina and Belgrade. The OSCE Mission in Kosovo published a trial monitoring report on the adjudication of war crimes cases on 8 July 2026, drawn from seven years of observation of proceedings before the Special Department of the Basic Court of Prishtine/Pristina, and such monitoring is worth more than either government's account of the same hearing.

5. A Multi-Ethnic Kosovo, an Undivided Territory and a Settlement with Serbia

Kosovo's legitimacy depends on how it treats the communities that opposed independence. Kosovo Serbs require more than a general guarantee of equality. They need practical security, Serbian-language education and administration, local competence over community services, sustainable links with Serbia, and a protected channel of

participation in central institutions. These arrangements are to be strong without becoming a parallel sovereign authority capable of partitioning the state.

Language is where the guarantee is tested first, because it is where a resident meets the state daily. Albanian and Serbian are official languages under Article 5 of the Constitution, with Turkish, Bosnian and Roma official at municipal level. The OSCE Mission in Kosovo published an advocacy brief on 24 July 2026, Language Rights in Practice: Why Joint Action Cannot Wait, setting out gaps in the protection of language rights and priority areas for support. The High Commissioner on National Minorities, Christophe Kamp, visited from 23 to 27 March 2026 and raised compliance with the language law and consultation with non-majority communities on laws and policies affecting them directly. Implementation, not enactment, is the measure.

Serbian Orthodox churches, monasteries, cemeteries and archives are not negotiating currency. They belong to the living heritage of Kosovo, of the Serbian Orthodox Church and of the Serbian people, and their protection is an obligation of the Kosovo state. It is also already an obligation of Kosovo law. Law No. 03/L-039 creates Special Protective Zones around named sites including Decan, the Patriarchate of Peja and Gracanica, prohibits industrial development, mineral extraction and construction causing deforestation or pollution inside them, and requires the agreement of the Church before specified commercial development and other activities proceed. Attacks, appropriation, historical erasure or restrictions on worship are attacks on Kosovo's own constitutional order, because the principle they violate is the one on which Kosovo's independence rests.

Roma, Ashkali, Egyptian, Bosniak, Turkish and Gorani communities are not parties to the quarrel between Pristina and Belgrade, and their protection cannot wait on either capital taking up their case. The 2024 census recorded a Serb share of 3.31 per cent and, alongside it, Bosniak 1.69, Turkish 1.21, Ashkali 1.01, Egyptian 0.66, Gorani 0.57 and Roma 0.54 per cent. Reporting on the enumeration records that Serbs in the four northern municipalities largely did not take part and that the statistics agency worked from estimates there, so the recorded Serb share is a floor and not a count. Guarantees of language, education, documentation, local government and equal access apply to every one of these communities on identical terms.

KOSOVO PRINCIPLE

Recognition of Kosovo rests on sustained statehood and the failure of the former constitutional order, but it carries continuing duties toward Serbs, Roma, Bosniaks, Turks, Gorani and every other community.

5.1 Territory, the North and Opposition to Partition

Kaharagia recognises Kosovo within its existing constitutional boundaries. It does not endorse unilateral partition or the annexation of northern Kosovo by Serbia, nor the compulsory union of Kosovo with Albania. Boundary changes and forms of association are legitimate only where peacefully negotiated and accepted by the states and affected communities. Territorial exchange would endanger communities outside the exchanged areas, reward coercive demographic strategies and generate wider regional claims.

Self-management for Serb-majority municipalities is an outstanding obligation and not a Kaharagian invention. Serbia's Office for Kosovo and Metohija publishes the agreed General Principles and Main Elements of the Association or Community, together with a running count of the time elapsed since the obligation was assumed. Article 7 of the 2023 Agreement requires an appropriate level of self-management for the Serbian community in Kosovo, permits financial support from Serbia, and requires the status of the Serbian Orthodox Church to be formalised and its heritage sites protected. The Implementation Annex requires Kosovo to launch those negotiations immediately under European Union facilitation.

An association of that kind can be compatible with Kosovo's sovereignty, provided it does not become a foreign-controlled state within the state and equivalent human-rights standards apply throughout the country. It must not become a vehicle for permanent outside control or armed obstruction. The predominantly Serb north is entitled to meaningful local self-government and cross-border access on those terms.

The politics of the north changed at the ballot box in 2025, and that change is to be respected rather than resented. Kosovo held local elections on 12 October 2025, at which the Serb List won nine of the ten mayoralties in Serb-majority municipalities and returned to the four northern municipalities. Those four had been led since 2023 by mayors elected in extraordinary elections on a turnout below ten per cent after a boycott. Kosovo's authorities are to avoid abrupt unilateral measures that close essential services or exclude residents from decisions directly affecting them.

Violence in the north is a criminal matter and is treated as one. On 24 April 2026 the Basic Court in Pristina convicted three men of terrorism over the armed attack at Banjska on 24 September 2023, in which a Kosovo police officer and three gunmen were killed, sentencing two to life imprisonment and one to thirty years. Milan Radoicic, who was among those charged and who publicly stated that he organised the attack, was not tried in those proceedings. Kaharagia records the convictions as first-instance judgments of a Kosovo court and draws no conclusion from them about any community.

5.2 Relations with Serbia and Normalisation

Recognition requires no hostility toward Serbia and no denial of Serbian historical and cultural attachment. Kaharagia supports normalisation, mutual recognition or an equivalent conclusive settlement, and supports the framework facilitated by the European Union.

That framework is exact about what each side owes. Article 1 of the 2023 Agreement requires the parties to develop normal neighbourly relations and to recognise each other's documents and national symbols, including passports, diplomas, licence plates and customs stamps. Article 3 requires disputes to be settled exclusively by peaceful means and the threat or use of force to be avoided. Article 4 provides that neither party represents the other internationally and that Serbia will not object to Kosovo's membership in any international organisation. The Implementation Annex places the Agreement inside both European Union accession processes, calls for a declaration on missing persons as a matter of urgency, and required a Joint Monitoring Committee within thirty days. That committee was established on 18 April 2023 under

European Union chairmanship.

The framework is less exact about how it binds. The High Representative recorded on 27 February 2023 only that the parties agreed no further discussion of the proposal was needed and were ready to proceed with implementation. Kaharagia therefore treats the Agreement and its Annex as political commitments of the parties and as benchmarks in their accession processes, and not as a treaty. Nothing in Kaharagian recognition depends on their fulfilment.

What recognition denies Serbia is one thing: a continuing sovereign veto over whether Kosovo exists. Serbia keeps every other position. It may withhold recognition, argue its case in any forum open to it, maintain lawful and transparent ties with Kosovo Serbs, and negotiate for the terms it prefers.

6. What Changes for Kosovo on the Day of Recognition

Under the Sovereign's instrument, Kosovo is a state for Kaharagian purposes. Its legal personality, its capacity to conclude treaties and its standing before Kaharagian bodies follow. Its constitutional institutions are those entitled to act for it.

No mission opens and no accreditation, immunity or privilege is conferred. No administration in Pristina is endorsed. No boundary is settled beyond the existing constitutional boundaries. No criminal proceeding is prejudged. No party's historical account becomes Kaharagia's. Recognition further does not authorise:

- Coercive measures against Serb-majority municipalities, the closure of essential services, or policing conducted as a demonstration of sovereignty.
- Treating Kosovo Serbs who reject independence as disloyal. Peaceful opposition to a state's existence is a political position, not an offence.
- The use of Kosovo Serbs by Serbia or any other state as an instrument, or the making of their security conditional on their politics.
- Collective blame in either direction, whether against Albanians for proceedings brought against individuals or against Serbs for the acts of a former state's forces.
- Refusal of documents, residence or civil status to anyone in Kosovo or displaced from it, on grounds of community or political opinion.

6.1 Conditional Support, Unconditional Statehood

The Operative Declaration conditions Kaharagian support upon equal citizenship, minority protection, local self-government, religious and cultural preservation, and peaceful normalisation. Recognition of Kosovo's statehood is not itself conditional and does not lapse where a condition is unmet. What is conditioned is the support Kaharagia extends: its advocacy, its willingness to open relations, and the terms of any cooperation. These are conditions the State has set and by which it will be held.

Review follows DM-2026-001. This publication falls to be reviewed if control, borders or democratic conditions materially change, if the formally expressed position of the people concerned changes, or if a settlement alters the boundary or the constitutional relationship. A deterioration in minority protection engages Kaharagian

support, official contact and public criticism. It does not, by itself, unmake a state. The trial judgment due on 16 September 2026 will be read as what it is, a judgment at first instance about named individuals, and it bears on no question of statehood.

7. Operative Declaration

The State of Kaharagia recognises the Republic of Kosovo as a sovereign and independent state within its existing constitutional boundaries, subject to any peaceful and mutually agreed territorial settlement. It recognises Kosovo's constitutional institutions as entitled to act for the state, while conditioning Kaharagian support upon equal citizenship, minority protection, local self-government, religious and cultural preservation, and peaceful normalisation with Serbia. Diplomatic relations are not established by this instrument and remain reserved to a separate decision.

8. Publication and Legal Effect

This memorandum is a public statement of the foreign policy of the State of Kaharagia, adopted by the Sovereign and issued through the Secretariat of State, Section II. Under Kaharagian constitutional practice, the recognition or non-recognition of a state, the recognition of a government, the establishment of a diplomatic mission, the imposition of sanctions and the entry into formal diplomatic relations are decisions reserved to the Sovereign and implemented through the appropriate instrument. A Diplomatic Memorandum states the grounds, scope, reservations and consequences of a policy; it does not by itself confer accreditation, immunity or privilege.

This memorandum is published in the Diplomatic Memorandum Series by the Office of the Sovereign's Printer. Its serial reference is preserved in every separate or electronic edition. Material changes in facts, control, legal proceedings or the formally expressed position of the people concerned trigger review. Every authority listed below was checked against the issuing body's own publication when this edition was prepared.

Selected Authorities and Official Materials

Each entry gives the title, the issuing body, the date and a link. Links to a host other than the issuing body are marked Source. The list keeps legal character on the face of the entry. An advisory opinion is separated from a judgment, a resolution of the General Assembly from a resolution of the Security Council, a trial judgement from the appeal judgement that varied its sentences, a judgment scheduled for delivery from one already delivered, an agreed text the parties did not sign from a treaty, and press reporting from the official record.

1. *Security Council resolution 1244 (1999).* United Nations Security Council, adopted under Chapter VII at the 4011th meeting, 10 June 1999. Paragraph 11(k) makes assuring the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo a responsibility of the international civil presence, and paragraph 9(c) requires the international security presence to establish a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons can return home in safety. Full text published by the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo.
https://unmik.unmissions.org/en/united-nations-resolution-1244

2. *Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo.* International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion, 22 July 2010. An advisory opinion, not a judgment.
https://www.icj-cij.org/case/141
3. *Summary of the Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010.* International Court of Justice. Records the votes and the limits of the holding.
https://www.icj-cij.org/node/103912
4. *The Court finds that the declaration of independence of Kosovo adopted on 17 February 2008 did not violate international law.* International Court of Justice, press release, 22 July 2010. Records that the opinion was requested by General Assembly resolution 63/3 of 8 October 2008.
https://www.icj-cij.org/node/101885
5. *Letter dated 26 March 2007 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, transmitting the report of the Special Envoy on Kosovo's future status (S/2007/168).* United Nations, 26 March 2007. A proposal transmitted to the Council; no resolution was adopted on it.
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/document/kosovo-s2007-168.php
6. *Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo.* Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo. Articles 1, 3, 5, 22, 64 and 143.
https://gzk.rks-gov.net/ActDocumentDetail.aspx?ActID=3702
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8. *Population and Housing Census in Kosovo 2024: first final results, presented 19 December 2024.* Kosovo Agency of Statistics, published by the Office of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Kosovo.
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9. *Headcount Results Show Kosovo Faces Declining Population and Rising Urbanization.* Prishtina Insight, 20 December 2024. Reporting, cited for the census boycott in the four northern municipalities.
https://prishtinainsight.com/headcount-results-show-kosovo-faces-declining-population-and-rising-urbanization/
10. *OSCE Mission in Kosovo: mandate and areas of work.* Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, established 1 July 1999.
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11. *Trial Monitoring Report on the Adjudication of War Crimes Cases in Kosovo.* OSCE Mission in Kosovo, 8 July 2026.
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