

DIPLOMATIC MEMORANDA OF KAHARAGIA

**Diplomatic Memorandum on the Recognition of
the Republic of Somaliland**

DM-2026-007



Diplomatic Memorandum on the Recognition of the Republic of Somaliland

Restored independence, effective statehood and contested eastern districts

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Issued by the Secretariat of State, Section II — Foreign Affairs. A Diplomatic Memorandum states the position of the State of Kaharagia on a question of recognition or contested sovereignty, the grounds on which that position rests, and the reservations to which it is subject. Recognition, accreditation, immunity and privilege are conferred by the appropriate Sovereign instrument; this publication records the position those instruments give effect to.

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The Determination

POSITION OF THE STATE

Kaharagia recognises the Republic of Somaliland as a sovereign state, with an express reservation concerning the contested districts of Sool, Sanaag and Cayn

SELF-DETERMINATION	Recognised. The population of Somaliland has maintained a durable claim to restored independence.
STATE RECOGNITION	Extended.
GOVERNMENT	Somaliland’s constitutional institutions are recognised as entitled to act for the state, subject to democratic and human-rights obligations.
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS	Not established by this instrument. Reserved to a separate decision.
TERRITORIAL RESERVATION	The final status of the contested parts of Sool, Sanaag and Cayn is excluded from the effect of this act, to be resolved peacefully and with local consent.

COMMON DOCTRINAL BASIS

A people’s right to self-determination is not extinguished by an inherited border. Nor is it fulfilled by foreign occupation, coerced integration, ethnic cleansing, demographic engineering, or a nominal independence maintained under another state’s effective control. Recognition of a state is separate from endorsement of its government and from the establishment of diplomatic relations.

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1. Executive Position

Kaharagia recognises the Republic of Somaliland as a sovereign state. Somaliland corresponds broadly to the former British Somaliland Protectorate, which became independent on 26 June 1960 and entered a union with the former Italian-administered territory days later. The united Somali Republic was admitted to the United Nations as a single state on 20 September 1960, on the recommendation of the Security Council. Following state collapse and mass violence, a conference of northern communities at Burco in 1991 declared independence and disbanded the 1960 Act of Union, and Somaliland has maintained separate institutions since.

Recognition carries one reservation, and that reservation is part of the act. Kaharagia does not recognise Somaliland's title to the contested parts of Sool, Sanaag and Cayn. Those districts are excluded from the effect of the act, to be settled peacefully and with local consent. Recognition opens no mission, fixes no eastern boundary and endorses no administration in Hargeisa.

Recognition does not rest on the convenience of a patron. Israel announced recognition of Somaliland on 26 December 2025, and that announcement changed the diplomatic context. It is not the source of Somaliland's claim and it is not the reason for this act. Kaharagia's grounds are three decades older than that announcement and would stand if it were withdrawn tomorrow: sustained popular will, effective governance, an inherited external boundary, and the failure of the union to produce an accepted common state.

1.1 The Somaliland Disposition: Recognition With Reservations

Somaliland is decided on four separate questions, and an answer to one leaves the others open, and nothing is decided by implication. Taken in order:

- **The right of self-determination.** Recognised. The population of Somaliland has maintained a durable claim to restored independence.
- **Statehood.** Recognised, subject to the territorial reservation set out below.
- **Government.** Somaliland's constitutional institutions are recognised as entitled to act for the state, subject to democratic and human-rights obligations. No administration in office is endorsed by this act.
- **Diplomatic relations.** Not established here. They may be established separately by a decision of the Sovereign.

The disposition is recognition with reservations, the second of the five in DM-2026-001. Kaharagia recognises the constitutional institutions of Somaliland, not the record of whoever occupies them, and one identified question is excluded from the effect of the act. That separation allows the criticisms below to be made without unsettling the recognition. A reservation of this kind is a determination in its own right.

2. The Claim Tested: Restored Statehood, Not Provincial Secession

DM-2026-001 requires a case to be placed in one of three families before any further test is applied, because the claimant's burden differs according to where the claim begins. Classification is what Somalia and Somaliland disagree about. Somalia's classification is separation from a settled state, the third family and the heaviest burden: the claimant must show that internal self-determination has been denied and that no rights-respecting constitutional remedy remains. Somaliland's is the second family, restored statehood after a contested union, which resumes a former status and draws no new frontier.

Neither party chooses. Classification is a question of history. A parent state cannot convert one family into another by administering a territory for long enough, and a claimant cannot convert an ordinary separation into a restoration by asserting an older sovereignty it cannot demonstrate. Somaliland could fail that test and does not. The former protectorate became independent on 26 June 1960 and entered the union days later. That is a separate international personality, however brief, and it is a matter of record.

The union's foundation is contested on the African Union's own evidence. A fact-finding mission led by the Deputy Chairperson of the Commission visited Somaliland from 30 April to 4 May 2005 and reported that the union between Somaliland and Somalia "was never ratified" and that it malfunctioned "when it went into action from 1960 to 1990". That finding was made by the organisation whose settled practice is now urged against the claim, and it was made twenty years before the present dispute arose.

What the union later produced in the north is documented, and its legal character must be stated exactly. A preliminary study prepared for the United Nations by a consultant, Chris Mburu, and commissioned jointly by the United Nations Co-ordination Unit under UNDP-Somalia and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, concluded that "the crime of genocide was conceived, planned and perpetrated by the Somali Government against the Isaaq people of northern Somali between 1987 and 1989". That document is a draft preliminary study by an individual consultant, carried out between December 2001 and March 2002. It is not a determination of any organ of the United Nations, and no court has entered judgment on the allegation. The same study records reports that the Somali National Movement executed captured government soldiers, which it describes as a clear violation of the Geneva Conventions. Kaharagia records the study for what it is and does not convert it into a conviction by repetition.

Somaliland is therefore not required to show that no constitutional remedy remains inside Somalia, because it is not asking to leave a settled state. It must show that the prior status existed, that the union is genuinely contested, and that the people concerned sustain the claim across time. Nor is this unfinished decolonisation, and Kaharagia does not borrow that vocabulary from DM-2026-006. The people of the protectorate were not prevented from choosing. They chose in 1960, and the complaint concerns what the choice produced.

2.1 The Inherited Border, Taken at Full Strength

The African Union has rejected recognition and reaffirmed Somalia's unity and territorial integrity, invoking the principle of inherited borders. The objection deserves its full weight. Africa's colonial frontiers were drawn without the consent of the people inside them, and treating them as fixed accepted a bad set of lines to avoid fighting over each one. A state that unpicks that settlement for a case it finds sympathetic must answer for the cases that follow, and the weakest states pay first.

The instrument invoked can be read. Resolution AHG/Res.16(I), adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at Cairo between 17 and 21 July 1964, declares that "all Member States pledge themselves to respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence". Somaliland claims the borders existing on the achievement of its national independence on 26 June 1960. The African Union's 2005 mission recorded that Somaliland's state-building was anchored "on the recognition by the Somalilanders of the inherited colonial borders at the time of independence from Britain in June 1960". Read as written, the Cairo pledge is the foundation of this claim rather than the answer to it.

DM-2026-001 accepts the presumption and states what it is for. An inherited boundary settles which line is the starting point, not whether the people inside it have consented. The same principle may therefore support a claim to restore a former external boundary and defeat a claim to draw a new internal one. Applied here it runs with Somaliland, which claims the external limit of the former protectorate, proposes no frontier matched to clan settlement, and asks no neighbour to surrender territory. Recognition on that basis establishes nothing for a movement seeking to divide an African state along ethnic lines, which would sit in the third family and carry the heavier burden. The answer holds only while Somaliland's claim stays inside the protectorate line. A Somaliland that redrew the eastern boundary to match whoever could be governed would forfeit the argument that carries it here, and the reservation entered below is what keeps the two propositions consistent.

The African Union has said more than one thing about this case, and both statements are before the Secretariat. The 2005 mission reported that the failure of the union made Somaliland's search for recognition "historically unique and self-justified in African political history", that the case "should not be linked to the notion of 'opening a Pandora's box'", and that the Union "should find a special method of dealing with this outstanding case". On 26 December 2025 the Chairperson of the Commission rejected any recognition, stated that Somaliland "remains an integral part of the Federal Republic of Somalia", and invoked the intangibility of inherited borders under the 1964 decision. Kaharagia treats neither statement as an adjudication. It records that the objection from continental practice was answered, on the same facts, by a mission the continent sent.

2.2 The Peace and Security Council Communiqué and the Duty of Non-Recognition

On 6 January 2026 the Peace and Security Council of the African Union met at ministerial level, its 1324th meeting, and addressed the preservation of Somalia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. It condemned and rejected Israel's recognition and called for

its immediate revocation. It declared that no actor has the authority or standing to alter the territorial configuration of a Member State and that “any such declaration is null, void, and without legal effect under international law”. It called upon Member States and international partners to reaffirm Somalia’s sovereignty and unity and to reject illegal acts undermining international principles. It reaffirmed the Cairo pledge of 1964.

DM-2026-001 requires that instrument to be classified before it is weighed. It is a decision of a regional organisation, taken by its executive organ for peace and security and addressed to its own members and to partners. It is not a judgment, it determines the status of no territory, and it does not in terms call upon states to withhold recognition. The duty of non-recognition in DM-2026-001 arises where a situation is the product of a serious breach of a peremptory norm, and in particular where competent international organs have called upon states to withhold recognition. The communiqué identifies no peremptory norm breached by Somaliland. It rests on territorial integrity and on inherited borders, and it is directed at the act of a third state rather than at the conduct of the entity whose status is in issue.

The contrast with DM-2026-008 is exact, and it is the reason the two files end differently. Security Council resolution 541 (1983) deplored the declaration of 15 November 1983 as legally invalid, called for its withdrawal, and called upon all States not to recognise any Cypriot State other than the Republic of Cyprus. No resolution of the Security Council addresses the status of Somaliland. Were an instrument of that character to issue, this determination would fall to be reconsidered under that heading rather than on its merits, because a duty of that kind cannot be cured by attaching reservations.

2.3 The 2001 Referendum and What the Evidence Will Bear

Somaliland’s Constitution affirmed independence and was approved at a referendum held on 31 May 2001. A ten-person monitoring team of the Initiative and Referendum Institute reported approval by about 97 per cent of those voting, on a turnout the team put at more than 66 per cent of the estimated voting-age population. A result reported by the authority it vindicates is evidence, not proof, and the observers recorded their own limits: the Somaliland government provided all transport and translators, and the Somaliland Forum paid the delegation’s airfare, food and lodging. Kaharagia does not rest a recognition on a figure it cannot test.

The recognition does not rest there. A referendum records a preference on one day. Somaliland has maintained civil administration, courts, an electoral commission and a biometric voter register carrying 1,227,048 names by 2024, and has sustained a separate political order for more than three decades, with a stability that distinguishes it from much of Somalia’s experience since 1991. Persistence of that kind is evidence a single vote cannot supply. Effectiveness alone creates no right to secede, and DM-2026-001 is explicit that functioning institutions settle no status question. It matters here because of what it is combined with: a prior separate boundary, a voluntarily attempted union, decades of separate political development and persistent popular support. Remove the first and this becomes an ordinary secession.

DM-2026-001 imposes a prior question. Before asking what a people has chosen, Kaharagia shall ask who was permitted to choose. The 2001 record answers it in part, and

the part it leaves open is the reason for the reservation. The Institute's delegation observed 57 of 600 polling stations in five of Somaliland's six regions. It chose to send no observer at all to Sool, which it described as the most volatile region of Somaliland with opposition to the referendum, and sent a single observer to Sanaag. On the certified results the Institute reported, Sool returned the highest negative vote of any region at 16 per cent against, where the other five regions averaged 98 per cent in favour. In the Las Anod district 45 per cent voted against, and the negative vote prevailed in nine of the 23 polling stations there.

Two conclusions follow from that record, and neither is convenient. The eastern districts did take part, so the assertion that they were simply excluded from the founding act is not made out. And the one region that divided is the region no independent observer watched. The Institute also recorded that in Sool and Sanaag, populated substantially by clans other than the Isaaq, some inhabitants did not recognise the independence of Somaliland and continued to consider themselves part of a larger Somalia. Where the constituency can be defended, the claim is made out. Where it cannot, the claim is not defeated; it is reserved.

3. Unrecognised, and Without a Sponsor

DM-2026-001 locates every case on a scale of three. Dependency is ordinary among recognised states and does not defeat statehood. Effective control shifts the burden, and the entity must then show that the will it expresses is its own. Absorption is the condition the core maxim forbids. That scale decides DM-2026-002, DM-2026-003 and DM-2026-004. It does not decide DM-2026-008. That file places Northern Cyprus at effective control on the same scale, then withholds recognition on a duty of non-recognition, which no position on the scale supplies. On the present file the scale is the least contested part of the case.

Somaliland has maintained public institutions, security structures, taxation, elections and external relations for decades without the level of foreign military sponsorship found in several other unrecognised entities. Its settlement was built at its own conferences. The Burco conference of 1991 reconciled the warring parties, disbanded the 1960 Act of Union and provided for the accommodation of non-Isaaq clans in the governing structure. The Hargeisa conference of February 1997 ended hostilities, provided for demobilisation and an interim constitution, and increased the representation of minority clans in parliament. The claim to self-government predates any external sponsor by decades, and the institutions were built without one. No transfer of state functions, merger of institutions or mass conferral of another state's citizenship appears in the materials before the Secretariat.

Kaharagia therefore finds dependency at most on this record, and no finding of external effective control appears in the materials before it. Most entities in this series have been unrecognised and sponsored; Somaliland has been unrecognised without a sponsor of that kind, which is why its endurance carries the weight it does. That is the strongest single element of its case and the element most easily lost. A security or basing arrangement Somaliland could not lawfully terminate, decisive external influence over its security institutions, or the conferral of another state's citizenship on its pop-

ulation at scale would move the case down the scale and engage the review provision below.

SOMALILAND PRINCIPLE

Somaliland's case rests on restored pre-union statehood, durable institutions and popular will, not on patronage from any later recognising state.

3.1 Sea Access, Recognition and the Price of an Airfield

The transactions this doctrine forbids have been proposed in this case, by more than one party, and they are the reason the prohibition is stated here rather than assumed. On 1 January 2024 Somaliland and Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding on access to the Somaliland coast, whose text was not published and which Somaliland described as carrying recognition in return. On 11 December 2024 Ethiopia and Somalia signed the Ankara Declaration, facilitated by Türkiye, which provides for Ethiopia's "assured access to and from the sea, whilst respecting the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Somalia", and "under the sovereign authority of the Federal Republic of Somalia", with technical negotiations to begin no later than the end of February 2025 and to be concluded within four months.

The Associated Press reported on 14 March 2025 that officials in Sudan, Somalia and Somaliland had been approached about receiving Palestinians relocated from Gaza. Somaliland and Somalia officials denied being approached or in talks. An American official was reported as acknowledging "having a quiet conversation with Somaliland about a range of areas where they can be helpful to the U.S. in exchange for recognition". That is reporting, not a finding, and Kaharagia does not treat it as establishing what was offered. It establishes that the currency was named.

Kaharagia rejects any proposal to use Somaliland, or any other state, as a destination for the coerced or engineered displacement of Palestinians from Gaza or the West Bank. Somaliland's legitimate search for recognition is not tied to population transfer, annexation or the destruction of Palestinian sovereignty. DM-2026-010 states the rule: relocation produced by starvation, bombardment, closed borders or the denial of return is not free migration, and no agreement with a third state may legitimise it. Somalia's Defence Minister asserted on 11 January 2026 that Israel planned such a transfer to Somaliland. Israel's Foreign Minister said displacement of Palestinians "was not part of our agreement", and Somaliland's foreign ministry has denied any such arrangement. Kaharagia records the assertions and the denials, adopts neither as a finding, and states its position on the scheme itself.

3.2 Israel's 2025 Recognition and the Independence of Kaharagian Judgment

The recognition announced on 26 December 2025 introduces the relationship the patron scale watches. It is the first fact in the file capable of weakening Somaliland's case, and it strengthens nothing in it. Reporting of the announcement describes a joint declaration of mutual recognition, framed in the language of the Abraham Accords, with embassies to be opened and ambassadors appointed. On 29 December 2025 an Assistant Secretary-General briefed the Security Council on the regional con-

sequences, recording that twenty Middle Eastern and African countries had issued a joint statement rejecting the recognition, and that Somalia had said it would not permit any foreign military base or arrangement drawing it into proxy conflicts. A risk of instability is a reason to act carefully, not a finding about who holds title to a territory.

DM-2026-001 disposes of the arithmetic. Recognition is not a poll. The number of states recognising an entity, and the identity of the most recent, are facts about those states. They do not answer the question this doctrine asks. On the materials before the Secretariat, Israel is the only state to have recognised Somaliland, and the rule that would have prevented Kaharagia from recognising Somaliland during the decades when no state did is the rule that prevents it from recognising because one state now has. Kaharagia does not treat recognition as a transaction for military access, strategic alignment or support for another state's regional agenda. The prohibition binds both ways: it forbids a recognition bought with an airfield, and a refusal designed to avoid the cost of holding a position.

Recognition of a state does not ratify its government's bilateral arrangements. Kaharagia's act carries no Kaharagian position on the status of any city, boundary or territory outside the former protectorate, and no party may cite it as one.

4. Contested Eastern Districts and the Limits of Recognition

Somaliland does not exercise uncontested legitimacy throughout every territory it claims, and the shortfall is now measurable rather than asserted. The international mission that observed the 2024 elections recorded that Somaliland's National Electoral Commission "was not able to operate in some districts of Sool and Sanaag as they were not under the control of the Somaliland authorities during the election period". A state whose electoral administration cannot enter a district does not hold that district by consent.

The human cost is documented. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported on 3 April 2023 that between 154,000 and 203,000 people had been displaced by the fighting at Laas Caanood since late December 2022, that those displaced inside Somalia had moved into villages in Sool, Togdheer, Nugaal and Mudug, and that an estimated 100,000 had crossed into the Somali Region of Ethiopia, where partners appealed for 116 million United States dollars. Displacement on that scale is the fact any consultation about these districts must be built around.

The administration of those districts has since changed hands and changed name. An SSC-Khaatumo administration was formed during the 2023 conflict and acknowledged by Somalia's federal government in October of that year. A conference at Las Anod on 30 July 2025 declared the formation of the North East State, replacing the interim administration, and the federal government recognised it as a federal member state. Puntland and Somaliland both maintain overlapping claims to the same territory. Kaharagia takes none of these steps as settling title.

DM-2026-001 governs this directly. A people asserting self-determination against a parent state acquires no licence to deny it to a community inside the territory it claims, and recognition authorises nothing by way of force, siege or the imposition of administration upon a population that rejects it. The claim Somaliland makes against

Mogadishu is the claim the eastern communities are entitled to make against Hargeisa, and Kaharagia cannot honour the first and dismiss the second because the second is smaller.

The reservation awards those districts to nobody. Kaharagia does not recognise Somaliland's title to them, and it does not recognise Somalia's title to them either. Nor does it accept ethnic partition as a default remedy, which rewards the coercive movement of people and endangers every community left on the wrong side of a new line. Effective control cuts in every direction: control of a district by Somaliland forces creates no title, control by a federal member state creates none either, and the recognition of an administration by Mogadishu is not a determination of sovereignty. Final affiliation is to be determined by local consultation, negotiation between Somaliland and Somalia, boundary commissions and, where necessary, internationally monitored local votes. Negotiated federal or autonomous arrangements are among the outcomes such a process may produce.

EASTERN DISTRICTS PRINCIPLE

Kaharagia recognises no title to the contested parts of Sool, Sanaag and Cayn, in Hargeisa or in Mogadishu. Effective control over a district is not sovereign title to it. Final affiliation is to be settled peacefully, with the consent of the people living in those districts and displaced from them.

Where a consultation is held, the constituency question applies with full force, and the 2001 and 2023 records show why. People displaced from the contested districts shall not be excluded because return has not yet been achieved, and residents shall not be disqualified on grounds of clan, origin or date of arrival. Registration rules, eligibility and the framing of the question shall be settled before the process begins, by a body no interested party controls. A vote taken on an electorate defined by the winner of the last engagement is evidence of the engagement, not of consent.

4.1 Why Northern Cyprus and Kosovo Do Not Decide This Case

DM-2026-008 declines to recognise the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, and a reader who sees two declarations by populations divided from a parent state may ask what separates them. Two things do. The Security Council treated the 1983 declaration as legally invalid and called upon states not to recognise it, and the only comparable instrument in the Somaliland file is a communiqué of a regional organisation that does not call for recognition to be withheld. That case also rests on findings by the European Court of Human Rights of Turkish effective overall control, and this file contains no equivalent finding against any state.

DM-2026-005 recognises Kosovo without a territorial reservation, and the difference is not that northern Kosovo is quiet. The two reservations would answer different questions. Kosovo's boundary is fixed and only the manner of its change is left open, which is by peaceful agreement with Serbia. Somaliland's eastern boundary is the question itself. Kosovo's record also contains an international administration, failed status negotiations and an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, because that claim arises from an autonomy dismantled inside a state whose sovereignty was not in question. Somaliland's arises from a sovereignty that existed and needs no

such apparatus.

DM-2026-006 recognises the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic as unfinished decolonisation, and that vocabulary does not transfer: Western Sahara turns on a choice never made and on settlement used to manufacture title against a colonised people. DM-2026-002, DM-2026-003 and DM-2026-004 are decided by the patron scale, which places them at two of its three points: effective control in Abkhazia and Transnistria, absorption in South Ossetia. Abkhazia alone of the three is recognised, because refusal of the patron is demonstrated there and the Abkhaz claim predates the patron's involvement. Somaliland is recognised with no finding of external control hanging over it, which none of those three can claim. The reservations differ in kind as well. Abkhazia's concerns people, and holds the recognised state to the rights of those expelled from it. Somaliland's concerns districts, and therefore the people living in them and displaced from them.

5. Objections: Hargeisa's Democratic Record and Mogadishu's Case

The strongest objection to this determination comes from Kaharagia's own principles, not from Mogadishu. A doctrine that demands a free and genuine choice, then recognises a state whose conditions of choice it criticises in the same paper, can fairly be accused of deciding first and reasoning after. The criticisms are therefore set out at their full strength.

The presidential election due on 13 November 2022 was not held. The electoral commission announced in September 2022 that it could not conduct the poll for budgetary and technical reasons, and in October 2022 the House of Elders extended the President's term by two years under an exceptional clause of the Constitution. Somaliland's Constitution and electoral laws permit only three registered political parties to field candidates. The international observation mission to the 2024 elections concluded that the combination of that restriction with a ten-year bar on forming new parties, unequal registration fees and the disqualification of candidates by party membership "constitutes a violation of Somalilanders' rights under Article 22 of the ICCPR", the right to freedom of association, and consequently of their rights under Article 25, the right to take part in public affairs through elections. Human Rights Watch reported for 2026 that the authorities continued to arrest journalists, politicians and other perceived critics, and recorded a local rights group's count of 16 journalists unlawfully detained in the first six months of 2025.

The record also contains the answer to the sharpest form of the objection. The election delayed from 2022 was held on 13 November 2024. Twenty-eight observers from thirteen countries observed 146 polling stations in all six regions and reported a well-managed and peaceful process whose results were widely accepted. The opposition candidate took 407,908 votes, 63.92 per cent of votes cast, against 225,519 and 34.81 per cent for the incumbent, on a turnout of 52.66 per cent. Power changed hands. An entity that removes its own government by counting is not an entity whose institutions exist only on paper.

The answer to the objection in principle lies in the separation of the four decisions. Re-

cognition is addressed to a state, and a state's legal personality does not rise and fall with the conduct of those holding office in it. What the conditions below attach to is not Somaliland's existence but Kaharagian support: diplomatic advocacy, the opening of relations, and the terms of any cooperation offered. A deterioration in electoral practice would engage support, official contact and public criticism. It would not unmake a state.

Effective government is not sufficient where democratic competition and civil liberties deteriorate, and this recognition is directed at strengthening constitutional accountability rather than rewarding incumbency. The expectations are these: elections at their constitutional time rather than by extension; a party system that admits more than three parties and permits independent candidates; free media; judicial independence; and equal rights across clan and minority lines. Minority clans, women and displaced people are the ones a recognition most easily overlooks, because they are absent from the negotiations it sets in motion. Kaharagia asks after them by name.

5.1 Relations With Somalia and the Succession Agenda

Recognition of Somaliland is not hostility towards the Federal Republic of Somalia. The two states share language, kinship, commerce and security interests, and nearly every question separation raises must be settled between them. Kaharagia encourages negotiations on assets and liabilities, debt, airspace, maritime boundaries, citizenship, pensions, archives, security cooperation and freedom of movement.

Somalia's position deserves an answer. A federal state rebuilding after collapse can reasonably say that the departure of a stable region raises the cost of everything it is trying to do, and that outside recognition removes the incentive to negotiate. Kaharagia's answer is narrow. What it declines to recognise is an unlimited veto over whether Somaliland exists. Every other Somali position survives: Somalia may withhold recognition, argue its case in any forum open to it, and negotiate for the terms it prefers.

Somaliland is bound by the same logic. Recognition removes neither the need to negotiate with Mogadishu nor the need to negotiate with the eastern communities. A settlement freely reached between two Somali states would serve regional peace better than permanent ambiguity, and Kaharagia supports the African Union and the United Nations as facilitators even where it reaches a different conclusion on recognition. Endless non-recognition also denies a functioning society normal international responsibility as well as normal international benefit, since an entity that cannot be recognised cannot easily be bound by treaty or held to a maritime obligation. That answers the suggestion that non-recognition is the cautious course, and it would not carry a case that failed the tests above.

5.2 Conditions Attaching to Kaharagian Support

The following conditions attach to Kaharagian support and engagement. None attaches to Somaliland's statehood. Each is capable of satisfaction by the government addressed and capable of assessment by an observer, because a condition no government could ever meet is a refusal wearing the language of encouragement. These are

conditions the State has set, and they are the measure against which support will be reviewed.

- Constitutional and electoral timetables that prevent further extensions of executive or legislative mandates of the kind granted in October 2022.
- Removal of the three-party limit and admission of independent candidates, as recommended by the mission that observed the 2024 elections.
- Protection of opposition parties, journalists, minority clans, women, internally displaced persons and residents of contested areas.
- A peaceful process for Sool, Sanaag, Cayn and other disputed localities, without presuming that military control establishes final title.
- No agreement facilitating forced Palestinian displacement, unlawful foreign basing or action incompatible with regional peace.

6. What Recognition Gives Hargeisa, and What It Does Not

Under the Sovereign instrument giving effect to this determination, Kaharagia recognises the Republic of Somaliland as a state under its own constitutional name. It recognises Somaliland's constitutional institutions as entitled to act for it. It treats Somaliland as a state in its terminology, its publications and its legal analysis. And it holds that no other state possesses a sovereign, tutelary or annexationist right over Somaliland.

No mission opens and no representative is accredited, because relations are a separate decision. Recognition fixes no eastern boundary, endorses no administration in office and validates no election. It prejudices nothing between Somaliland and Somalia on assets, debt, airspace or maritime limits. And it converts nobody's effective control into title.

6.1 What Recognition Does Not Authorise

Recognition is addressed to a state. It confers nothing on anyone against anybody living in the territory, displaced from it or living beyond it. Recognition does not authorise:

- The imposition of Hargeisa's administration by force, siege or blockade upon communities in Sool, Sanaag or Cayn that reject it, or the treatment of military success in those districts as settling their status.
- The treatment of the people displaced from Laas Caanood and the surrounding districts since December 2022 as having forfeited return, property, compensation or a voice in the status of their own homes.
- Reprisals, collective punishment or exclusion from public life directed at minority clans, at communities associated with SSC-Khaatumo or the North East State, or at people in Somaliland who oppose independence.
- Restrictions on journalists, opposition parties or peaceful assembly presented as a consequence of statehood, or the treatment of criticism of an administration as an attack on the state.

- Any arrangement facilitating the coerced displacement of Palestinians, unlawful foreign basing, or a foreign security presence Somaliland could not lawfully terminate.
- Retaliation against Somali citizens, Somaliland residents or their relatives, by any party, for Kaharagia's recognition or for the Israeli recognition that preceded it.

6.2 Review and Reversibility

Review follows DM-2026-001, and the reservation attached to this determination is held in place by it.

The recognition of Somaliland falls to be reviewed on any of the following: an arrangement transferring decisive control over Somaliland's security institutions or foreign policy to another state; the conferral of another state's citizenship upon the population at scale; the imposition of a settlement in the eastern districts by force; the closure of return, property or participation as practical possibilities for people displaced there; the systematic exclusion of minority clans or of opposition from public life; a settlement freely agreed between Somaliland and Somalia; a resolution of the Security Council addressing the status of the territory; and any freely expressed decision of the people concerned in favour of a different status. Review is the consequence of recognising a state on stated grounds.

7. Operative Declaration

The State of Kaharagia recognises the Republic of Somaliland as a sovereign and independent state. Such recognition is grounded in restored pre-union statehood, sustained popular will, and enduring effective institutions, and is not dependent upon the policy of any third state. Kaharagia does not prejudge the final status of the contested eastern districts and requires that their affiliation be determined peacefully, democratically, and with local consent. Diplomatic relations may be established separately.

8. Publication and Legal Effect

This memorandum is a public statement of the foreign policy of the State of Kaharagia. Under Kaharagian constitutional practice, the recognition or non-recognition of a state, the recognition of a government, the establishment of a diplomatic mission, the imposition of sanctions and the entry into formal diplomatic relations remain decisions reserved to the Sovereign and implemented through the appropriate instrument. This memorandum states the grounds, scope, reservations and consequences of the policy adopted; it does not by itself confer accreditation, immunity or privilege, and the recognition it states was effected by Sovereign instrument.

This memorandum is published in the Diplomatic Memorandum Series by the Office of the Sovereign's Printer. Its serial reference shall be preserved in every separate or electronic edition. Material changes in facts, control, legal proceedings or the formally expressed position of the people concerned shall trigger review under the heading above.

Selected Authorities and Official Materials

Every authority in this list was retrieved and read in the preparation of this publication. Titles are followed by the issuing body, the date and a source link. Judicial judgments, advisory opinions, resolutions of the Security Council, decisions of regional organisations, briefings, commissioned studies, observation reports and press reporting are identified according to their actual legal character, and none is described as more than it is. A link marked Official source leads to a host of the issuing state, court or international organisation. Every other link is marked Source, and where the only copy found sits away from the issuing body the entry says so.

1. *RESUME: AU Fact-Finding Mission to Somaliland (30 April to 4 May 2005)*. African Union Commission, mission led by the Deputy Chairperson H. E. Patrick Mazimhaka; records the 26 June 1960 independence, the union of July 1960, that the union “was never ratified” and “malfunctioned when it went into action from 1960 to 1990”, that Somaliland’s case is “historically unique and self-justified in African political history” and “should not be linked to the notion of ‘opening a Pandora’s box’”, and that the AU “should find a special method of dealing with this outstanding case”. The copy retrieved is hosted by a private archive and not by the African Union.
<https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/PDFFiles/au-fact-finding-mission-to-somaliland-30-april-to-4-may-2005.pdf>
2. *Border Disputes Among African States, resolution AHG/Res.16(I)*. Organization of African Unity, Assembly of Heads of State and Government, First Ordinary Session, Cairo, 17 to 21 July 1964; “all Member States pledge themselves to respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence”. Hosted by the African Union Peace and Security Department.
<https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/ahg-res-16-i-en.pdf>
3. *Admission of the Republic of Somalia to membership in the United Nations, resolution A/RES/1479(XV)*. United Nations General Assembly, adopted at the 864th plenary meeting, 20 September 1960.
<https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/206131>
4. *Security Council resolution 141 (1960) on the admission of Somalia to membership in the United Nations*. United Nations Security Council, 1960; recommendation to the General Assembly.
<https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/280597>
5. *Somaliland National Referendum, May 31, 2001: Final Report of the Initiative & Referendum Institute’s Election Monitoring Team*. Initiative & Referendum Institute, issued 27 July 2001; ten observers; 57 of 600 polling stations in five of six regions; no observer sent to Sool; certified results showing Sool 16 per cent against and Las Anod district 45 per cent against with the negative vote prevailing in nine of 23 polling stations; approval by about 97 per cent of those voting on a turnout above 66 per cent of the estimated voting-age population; Burco 1991 and Hargeisa 1997 conferences. The copy retrieved is hosted on a private website and not by the Institute.
http://www.somalilandlaw.com/Somaliland_Referendum_Report_2001.pdf
6. *Past Human Rights Abuses in Somalia: report of a preliminary study conducted for the United Nations (OHCHR/UNDP-Somalia)*. Prepared by Chris Mburu, consultant, December 2001 to March 2002; the title page is marked DRAFT. Issued to the bodies that commissioned it, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (Somalia Country Programme) and the United Nations Co-ordination Unit under the auspices of UNDP-Somalia; the report carries no United Nations document symbol, no imprint and no place of publication, and Kaharagia has found no copy on a United Nations host. A preliminary study by an individual consultant, not a determination of any organ of the United Nations and not a judicial finding. The copy retrieved is a 63-page unsearchable scan with no text layer, hosted by a campaign website on the Isaaq genocide.
<https://isaaqgenocide.info/doc/un-report.pdf>
7. *AUC Chairperson rejects any recognition of Somaliland*. African Union Commission, statement of H. E. Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, 26 December 2025; a statement of policy by the Chairperson, not an adjudication.
<https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20251226/auc-chairperson-rejects-any-recognition-somaliland>
8. *Communiqué of the 1324th meeting of the Peace and Security Council, held on 6 January 2026 at ministerial level, on the preservation of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and stability of the Federal Republic of Somalia*. African Union Peace and Security Council; a

decision of a regional organisation addressed to its Member States and partners, which does not in terms call upon states to withhold recognition.

<https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/communique-of-the-1324th-meeting-of-the-psc-held-on-6-january-2026-at-the-ministerial-level-on-the-preservation-of-the-sovereignty-territorial-integrity-unity-and-stability-of-the-federal-republic-of-somalia>

9. *ASG Khiari warns Security Council of regional risks following Israel's recognition of Somaliland.* United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, briefing of 29 December 2025; records the announcement of 26 December 2025, the joint statement of twenty Middle Eastern and African countries, and Somalia's position on foreign military bases. A briefing to the Council, not a decision of it.
<https://dppa.un.org/en/speeches-and-statements/asg-khiari-warns-security-council-of-regional-risks-following-israels>
10. *Israel becomes first country to recognize breakaway Somaliland as independent state.* The Times of Israel, 26 December 2025; reporting of the joint declaration of mutual recognition, the Abraham Accords framing, and the intention to open embassies and appoint ambassadors. Reporting, not an instrument.
<https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-becomes-first-country-to-recognize-breakaway-somaliland-as-independent-state/>
11. *Security Council resolution 541 (1983) on Cyprus.* United Nations Security Council, 18 November 1983; deplores the declaration of 15 November 1983 as legally invalid, calls for its withdrawal, and calls upon all States not to recognise any Cypriot State other than the Republic of Cyprus. Cited for the contrast with DM-2026-008.
[https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S/RES/541\(1983\)&I=E&t=pdf](https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S/RES/541(1983)&I=E&t=pdf)
12. *International Election Observation Mission to Somaliland's 2024 elections: final report.* University College London, mission led by Tim Cole, report launched 20 March 2025; 28 observers from 13 countries; 146 polling stations in all six regions; official results of the presidential poll; the finding that the National Electoral Commission “was not able to operate in some districts of Sool and Sanaag as they were not under the control of the Somaliland authorities during the election period”; the 2022 postponement and the two-year extension of the President's term; and the conclusion that the three-party restriction violates Articles 22 and 25 of the ICCPR.
<https://www.ucl.ac.uk/consultants/sites/consultants/files/sml7.pdf>
13. *Somalia: Flash Update No. 4, Situation in Laas Caanood, Sool Region, 3 April 2023.* United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs; 154,000 to 203,000 people displaced since late December 2022, displacement into Sool, Togdheer, Nugaal and Mudug, an estimated 100,000 crossing into the Somali Region of Ethiopia per UNHCR, and an appeal for 116 million United States dollars.
<https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/somalia/somalia-flash-update-no-4-situation-laas-caanood-sool-region-3-april-2023>
14. *Somalia, October 2025 Monthly Forecast.* Security Council Report, 30 September 2025; the declaration of the North East State at Las Anod on 30 July 2025 replacing the interim SSC-Khaatumo administration, its recognition by the federal government as a federal member state, the federal government's acknowledgement of SSC-Khaatumo in October 2023, and the overlapping claims of Puntland and Somaliland. Reporting on United Nations proceedings, not an instrument.
<https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2025-10/somalia-41.php>
15. *Ankara Declaration by the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Federal Republic of Somalia, facilitated by the Republic of Türkiye.* Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye, 11 December 2024; “assured access to and from the sea, whilst respecting the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Somalia”, “under the sovereign authority of the Federal Republic of Somalia”, technical negotiations to begin no later than end of February 2025 and to be concluded and signed in four months.
<https://www.mfa.gov.tr/etiopya-federal-demokratik-cumhuriyeti-ve-somali-federal-cumhuriyeti-nin-ankara-bildirisi.en.mfa>
16. *AP report: U.S. and Israel look to Africa for permanent relocation of Palestinians from Gaza.* Associated Press, 14 March 2025, published by PBS News; approaches to officials in Sudan, Somalia and Somaliland, the denials by Somaliland and Somalia officials, and an American official's acknowledgement of “a quiet conversation with Somaliland about a range of areas where they can be helpful to the U.S. in exchange for recognition”. Reporting, not a finding.
<https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/ap-report-u-s-and-israel-look-to-africa-for-permanent-relocation-of-palestinians-from-gaza>

17. *Somali minister says Israel plans to displace Palestinians to Somaliland*. Al Jazeera, 11 January 2026; the assertion by Somalia's Defence Minister, the denial by Israel's Foreign Minister that displacement "was not part of our agreement", and the denial by Somaliland's foreign ministry. Reporting of assertions and denials, adopted by Kaharagia as neither.
<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/1/11/somali-minister-says-israel-plans-to-displace-palestinians-to-somaliland>

18. *World Report 2026: Somalia*. Human Rights Watch; records that authorities in Somaliland continued to restrict discussion by arresting journalists, politicians and other perceived critics, and a local rights group's count of 16 journalists unlawfully detained in the first six months of 2025. A report by a non-governmental organisation, not a judicial determination.
<https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2026/country-chapters/somalia>

19. *Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo*. International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion, 22 July 2010; an advisory opinion, not a judgment. Cited for the contrast with DM-2026-005.
<https://www.icj-cij.org/case/141>



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